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This article addresses oil and gas case law developments that have
occurred within the Appalachian Basin’s primary oil and gas producing states of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio during 2021 by
reviewing opinions issued by the highest appellate courts within each
of these three states. The oil and gas law topics addressed by these
state supreme courts during 2021 have ranged from those occurring
upstream, such as leasing, to those occurring downstream, such as approval of a utility rate increase for the extension of a natural gas pipeline.
I. PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT
A. Application of State Consumer Protection Law to Oil and Gas
Leases
In Commonwealth v. Chesapeake Energy Corporation, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney
General (“OAG”) could not utilize the state’s Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) to pursue legal remedies
against an oil and gas lessee.1
The Pennsylvania OAG filed suit against two natural gas companies, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (“Anadarko”) and Chesapeake
Energy Corporation (“Chesapeake”), on behalf of private landowners
alleging “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices” in the companies’ handling of royalty payments, in violation of section 3 of the UTPCPL.2 The OAG alleged that certain joint
venture and market allocation agreements entered between Anadarko
and Chesapeake were illegal as they hindered what should have been
a fair and competitive royalty system. Additionally, the OAG alleged

1. 247 A.3d 934, 950 (Pa. 2021).
2. Id. at 938.
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that Anadarko engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts and practices within the joint venture.3
Anadarko filed preliminary objections, arguing that the UTPCPL
applied only to sellers in consumer transactions. Thus, Anadarko asserted that the UTPCPL claims were “legally insufficient” because
Anadarko had not sold anything.4 To the contrary, according to Anadarko, it had been in the position of a purchaser when it acquired mineral rights through the oil and gas leases.5
The Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County overruled Anadarko’s preliminary objections and found that acquiring mineral rights
qualifies as “trade and commerce” as spelled out in section 2(3) of the
UTPCPL6 because the acquisition of an oil and gas lease constitutes a
“distribution of services” as well as “any trade or commerce.”7 The
Court of Common Pleas also concluded that the anticompetitive conduct claims filed against Anadarko under the UTPCPL were “sufficient to survive a demurrer.”8
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order.9 Regarding the OAG’s authority
to pursue UTPCPL violations against an oil and gas lessee, the Commonwealth Court affirmed.10 The court noted that oil and gas leases
were the equivalents of sales because landowners transferred ownership of their natural gas rights to Anadarko for money.11 In addition,
the court pointed out that section 2(3) of the UTPCPL sets out “two
distinct and independent clauses” and that the second clause gives a
broader interpretation of the terms “trade” and “commerce.”12 As a
result, the court concluded that these terms include the “buying and
selling” of commodities as per the definitions of “trade” and
3. Id.
4. Id. at 938–39.
5. Id. at 939.
6. Id. at 934, 937. 73 P.S. § 201-2(3) provides that “‘Trade’ and ‘Commerce’
mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any
property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and includes any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth.”
7. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d at 939.
8. Id.
9. Id. The trial court certified two questions for appeal: 1) “whether the OAG
may bring claims under the UTPCPL in this case”; and 2) “whether the OAG’s antitrust allegations are cognizable under the UTPCPL ‘catchall’ provision in Section
2(4)(xxi).”
10. Id.
11. Id. at 939–40.
12. Id. at 940.
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“commerce” set out in the Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary and found
section 2(3) to be a “catch-all” provision.13
With regard to the antitrust claim, the Commonwealth Court concluded that antitrust violations could lead to UTPCPL actions if the
violation “fit[s] within one of the categories of behavior deemed, by
rule or in the Law itself, ‘unfair methods of competition’ or ‘unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.’”14 The court, however, found that the alleged “conduct generally impairing competition” did not fit into one
of those categories.15
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted a Petition for Allowance of Appeal, and on March 24, 2021, the Court ruled that the
UTPCPL did not provide authority for the OAG to file suit “against
Anadarko for its alleged unfair and deceptive practices in acquiring
natural gas leases from the landowners.”16 Based on the definitions of
“trade” and “commerce” in section 2(3), the Court determined that it
was the intent of the legislature for section 3 to cover “only acts of
selling . . . even though the ordinary meaning of those terms signifies
both buying and selling goods” and that the Commonwealth Court had
failed to recognize “the specialized legislative definition of trade and
commerce” by discarding the first part of section 2(3) and adopting a
common definition of these terms.17 The Supreme Court added that
the legislature would not have bothered to define the terms “trade” and
“commerce” in the first part of section 2(3) if it wanted those terms to
have a common meaning.18
The Supreme Court also found that the Commonwealth Court had
not appropriately applied Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent interpreting the UTPCPL.19 In one such case, Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, the Supreme Court had ruled that the UTPCPL
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 950.
17. Id. at 946.
18. Id. at 947.
19. Id. at 947–48. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 329 A.2d 812
(Pa. 1974); see also Danganan v. Guardian 179 A.3d 9 (Pa. 2018). In Danganan, the
Supreme Court ruled that the second part of Section 2(3) did “not modify or qualify
the preceding terms. Instead, it was appended to the end of the definition and prefaced by ‘and includes,’ thus indicating an inclusive and broader view of trade and
commerce than expressed by the antecedent language.” In the case at hand, the Supreme Court found that the Commonwealth Court did not properly understand their
decision, in that it “the Danganan Court said it was “‘inclusive,’ i.e., included the
first part, and ‘broader’ in that it applied to conduct ‘directly or indirectly affecting
the people of this Commonwealth.’”
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applied to a residential lease situation because the “tenants are in every
meaningful sense [the] consumer.”20 The Commonwealth Court had
expanded this ruling in the case at bar to include oil and gas leasing
situations.21 The Supreme Court reiterated its conclusion that the
UTPCPL protected only consumers and purchasers. In this oil and gas
lease, however, Anadarko was the purchaser and the landowners were
the sellers.22
Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that Anadarko did
not engage in “the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution”
of any product because the company merely acquired mineral rights,
making it a buyer, and that section 3 of the UTPCPL did not apply to
buyers in commercial transactions, only to sellers.23 Regarding the antitrust claim, the Supreme Court determined that since the OAG was
not entitled to bring claims against Anadarko under the UTPCPL, the
issue about the admissibility and use of antitrust remedies in this case
was moot.24
B. Application of Equitable Doctrine of Abandonment to Oil and Gas
Lease
In SLT Holdings, LLC, v. Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to apply the equitable doctrine of abandonment if the contractual remedies contained in the oil and gas lease
provided an adequate remedy at law.25
SLT Holdings, LLC, (“SLT”) was the lessor on oil and gas leases
that were held by Mitch-Well Energy, Inc., (“Mitch-Well”) as the lessee.26 The leases—upon two separate parcels—had been granted in
1985, and one well was drilled on each parcel.27 The wells produced
in paying quantities until 1996, but no additional production occurred
nor were any payments made after that time.28 In 2013, SLT filed a
complaint in equity against Mitch-Well, alleging that Mitch-Well had
abandoned its oil and gas rights as a result of its inaction.29

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

329 A.2d at 826.
Id. at 830.
Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d at 947.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 950.
249 A.3d 888, 890 (Pa. 2021).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 891.
Id.
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SLT filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking injunctive relief and damages for conversion as well as a court declaration
that Mitch-Well no longer held oil and gas rights on the property.30
The Court of Common Pleas of Warren County granted SLT’s motion
for partial summary judgment in 2018, relying on precedent established in Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp.31 and Aye v. Philadelphia
Co.32 to support abandonment of the leases.33 The Court of Common
Pleas contended that Mitch-Well’s “lack of further drilling, its cessation of production for 16 years from the single wells it did drill on each
lot, its failure to make required payments in lieu of royalties, its removal of equipment, and its closing of its business bank account all
raised a presumption of abandonment.”34
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Mitch-Well contended that there were genuine issues of material facts that should have
precluded the grant of summary judgment.35 Mitch-Well asserted that
SLT did not provide any opportunity for notice and cure as required
by the terms of the lease agreements and that the lease agreements
provided for the lessee to retain an interest in certain acreage around
each completed well in the case of an uncured breach.36 The Superior
Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.37
On April 29, 2021, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
the Superior Court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.38 In so ruling, the Supreme Court held both lower courts
missed an “essential initial step” in carrying out their analysis as to
whether the application of an equitable remedy was appropriate.39
Specifically, the Court opined that it would not grant equitable relief
if there was an adequate legal remedy.40 The Court found that
“[b]ecause [lessors] had available to them a full and adequate remedy
at law, through contract principles generally applicable to oil and gas
leases, and through the specific provisions of the subject leases, . . . it
was error to provide recourse through application of the equitable
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 891–92.
332 F. Supp. 2d 759 (W.D. Pa. 2004).
44 A. 555 (Pa. 1899).
SLT Holdings, LLC, 249 A.3d at 892–96.
Id. at 893–94.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 892, 897.
Id. at 892.
Id. at 888, 897.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 897.

2022]

APPALACHIAN BASIN

261

doctrine of abandonment.”41 Although the Court did not rule on the
substantive issue of whether abandonment had occurred, the Court did
note that “abandonment is the result of intention of the challenged
party, not that party’s non-performance.”42
C. Interpretation of Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights
Amendment
In Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Fund v. Commonwealth,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rendered an opinion addressing the
proper use of proceeds from oil and gas leases on state forest and game
lands.43 In 2012, the Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation
(“PEDF”) filed suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of legislative amendments to the Fiscal
Code that allowed the Commonwealth to move money received
through the leasing of state forest and game lands for oil and gas extraction from the Oil and Gas Lease Fund to the Pennsylvania General
Fund.44 According to PEDF, these amendments violated the Environmental Rights Amendment (“ERA”) in Article I, Section 27 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.45
In an earlier landmark decision issued in this same case, the Supreme Court affirmed that the ERA is a constitutional public trust subject to private trust law.46 As a result, the Court concluded that royalties derived from natural gas sold and extracted from leased stateowned lands represented a sale of trust assets that the state was required to return to the trust corpus.47 Thus, the transfer of these funds
to the Pennsylvania General Fund was improper.48 The Court, however, did not rule at that time whether bonus payments, delay rental
payments, and interest penalties for late payments also represented a
sale of trust assets and remanded the case to the Commonwealth Court
for consideration of that question.49
On remand, the Commonwealth Court held in 2019 that bonus
payments, delay rental payments, and interest penalties for late

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 890.
Id. at 895.
255 A.3d 289 (Pa. 2021).
Id. at 289, 292.
Id. at 292.
Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa. 2017).
Id. at 937–38.
Id. at 939.
Id. at 935–36.
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payments were income.50 Because these sources of income did not
originate from a sale of trust assets, the state did not have to return
them to the trust corpus.51 Furthermore, the court noted that the state
could deposit this income into the General Fund and then distribute it
among Pennsylvania citizens, as life tenants, and future generations,
as remaindermen, in conformity with a 1947 statute providing for income distribution schemes.52 According to this statute, the state must
distribute one-third (1/3) of royalty revenues for non-trust purposes
and return two-thirds (2/3) to the trust corpus.53
In its decision on appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the
Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that bonus payments, delay rental
payments, and interest penalties for late payments were income derived from trust assets.54 The Court, however, ruled that the Commonwealth Court’s application of the 1947 statute and its analysis of income distributions to life tenants and remainderman beneficiaries was
completely inapposite to the current case.55 Based upon the plain language of the ERA and private trust principles, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision and reiterated the principle that income derived from the oil and gas sold and extracted from
leased state-owned lands is part of a constitutional public trust, and, as
such, the state must return to the trust corpus.56 Accordingly, it was
improper for the state to remove bonus payments, delay rental payments, and interest penalties for late payments from the Oil and Gas
Lease Fund.57
D. Eminent Domain Claim for Natural Gas Storage Buffer Zone
In Hughes v. UGI Storage Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that it is not necessary for a pipeline company to have eminent
domain authority over a specific property in order to be liable for an
inverse condemnation claim.58 Rather, the fact that the entity has

50. Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 214 A.3d 748, 774 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2019).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 289, 314 (Pa. 2021).
55. Id. at 309.
56. Id. at 314.
57. Id.
58. 263 A.3d 1144 (Pa. 2021).
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eminent domain authority generally is sufficient for a party to assert
such a claim.59
UGI Storage Company (“UGI”) acquired a 1,216-acre underground natural facility—referred to as the Meeker storage field—and
applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity with the
Federal Energy Regulation Commission (“FERC”).60 As part of its application, UGI proposed to create a 2,980-acre buffer zone area surrounding the Meeker storage field.61 The property in question, owned
by Hughes is within the proposed buffer zone.62 FERC partially
granted UGI’s application but denied certification of portions of the
proposed buffer zone as UGI did not have the necessary property
rights for parcels—including the Hughes parcel—in that area.63
FERC, however, did certify those portions of the proposed buffer zone
for which UGI held pre-existing mineral rights.64
Hughes filed a lawsuit against UGI, alleging a de facto condemnation of their property.65 Hughes asserted that UGI applied for federal
certification of a buffer zone with the aim of preventing oil and gas
extraction around the Meeker storage field and that, despite their property not being part of the certified buffer zone, “[UGI’s] actions and
statements relative to the proposed buffer zone ‘were sufficient to prevent oil and gas exploration and production companies from seeking
to exploit the land located in the Meeker Buffer Zone for oil and
gas.’”66 Hughes argued that they were unable to gain profit from the
extraction of natural gas underneath their property.67 UGI countered
that “to be liable for a de facto taking, an entity must possess the power
of eminent domain relative to the plaintiffs’ property” and that it was
not afforded eminent domain authority following FERC’s denial of
their certificate application for portions of the proposed buffer zone.68
The Court of Common Pleas accepted UGI’s argument, citing
Gentle v. Blair County Convention & Sports Facilities Authority, for
the proposition that “[a] de facto taking occurs when an entity clothed
with the power of eminent domain has substantially deprived a
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id. at 1157.
Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1145–46.
Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1150–51.
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property owner of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his property.”69
Since UGI Storage was vested with the power of eminent domain only
for the Meeker storage field and portions of the buffer zone area not
including the Hughes parcel, the court determined that a de facto taking claim could not be supported.70 The Commonwealth Court affirmed this ruling, stating that UGI lacked federal certification to exercise eminent domain powers over the Hughes’ property.71
On appeal before the Supreme Court, Hughes argued that the
lower court ruling “provides a playbook for how public utilities like
UGI [Storage] can enjoy the full benefits and protections of a buffer
zone without providing any compensation to affected landowners.”72
Ruling in favor of Hughes, the Supreme Court observed that the Eminent Domain Code does not establish a requirement of a property-specific eminent domain power in this instance, stating specifically that
“a public or quasi-public entity need not possess a property-specific
power of eminent domain in order to implicate inverse condemnation
principles.”73
II. WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
A. Acceptance of Estimated Just Compensation in Eminent Domain
Proceeding
In Scherich v. Wheeling Creek Watershed Prevention & Flood
Prevention Commission, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
ruled that a landowner had a right to pursue just compensation proceedings in an eminent domain case even though the landowner had
accepted the payment of estimated just compensation proffered by the
government 27 years earlier.74
In 1990, the Wheeling Creek Watershed Protection and Flood
Prevention Commission (“Commission”) pursued a condemnation action under West Virginia Code section 54-2-14a, referred to as the
state quick-take statute, against the Scherichs to acquire two parcels
of their lands, including oil and gas rights, for the construction of a
69. Genter v. Blair Cty. Convention & Sports Facilities Auth., 805 A.2d 51, 55
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
70. Hughes, 263 A.3d at 1154.
71. Id. See also Hughes v. UGI Storage Co., 243 A.3d 278, 289 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2020).
72. Hughes, 263 A.3d at 1155.
73. Id. at 1158.
74. Scherich v. Wheeling Creek Watershed Prot. & Flood Prevention Comm’n,
855 S.E.2d 912 (2021).

2022]

APPALACHIAN BASIN

265

dam.75 The Commission offered compensation in the amount of
$97,000.00, which the Scherichs rejected.76 Nevertheless, the circuit
court agreed to the “quick take” of the land parcels and allowed the
Commission to deposit the estimated compensation amount with the
circuit clerk.77 As a result, the Commission held a defeasible title until
the court could resolve the compensation issue.78
In 1991, the Scherichs petitioned to receive the estimated just
compensation, and the Commission paid them the deposited amount
plus appropriate interest.79 No further proceedings occurred in the
matter until October 2018 when the Scherichs filed a Motion for Further Proceedings to Determine Just Compensation.80 The circuit court,
however, dismissed sua sponte the condemnation action during a status hearing.81 The circuit court stated that the fact that the Scherichs
accepted the estimated just compensation provides “sufficient proof of
accord and satisfaction such that [the Scherichs] have no further right
or claim to this matter.”82
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed
the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.83 Recalling the notice and opportunity portion of West Virginia
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b),84 the Supreme Court of Appeals explained that the circuit court “neither gave notice of its intent to dispose of this matter nor afforded Petitioners the opportunity to address
the grounds upon which the circuit court was considering for dismissal.”85
In addition, the Court noted that the lower court drew certain conclusions based on “substantive errors,” including the determinations
that it was the responsibility of the Scherichs to finalize the condemnation proceedings and that accord and satisfaction barred their
claims.86 The Court found that the condemning authority bears the
burden of concluding a condemnation action and that “[a] person
75. Id. at 914.
76. Id. at 914–15.
77. Id. at 914.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 921.
84. Id. at 916 (“Before a court may dismiss an action under Rule 41(b) notice
and an opportunity to be heard must be given to all parties of record.”).
85. Id. at 917.
86. Id. at 917–21.
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entitled to proceeds of a condemnation action filed pursuant to West
Virginia Code section 54-2-14a (1981) has the legal right to accept the
condemning authority’s estimate of just compensation without prejudicing such person’s right to challenge that amount.”87 Because the
burden was on the government to move the condemnation action forward, the 27 year delay in action did not preclude the landowners from
pursuing their claim.88
The Court, however, did conclude that the circuit court had
properly addressed the issue of public use raised by the Scherichs.89
The Scherichs argued that the Commission did not need to take their
oil and gas rights for the dam project and that its action “exceeded the
land needed for public use.”90 The circuit court held that “for the purposes mentioned in [the condemnation] Petition . . . the lands sought
to be acquired in this proceeding are necessary for [the Commission’s]
use for the purposes aforesaid and are not in excess of the quantity
reasonably necessary for such purposes.”91
B. Application of “Stranger to the Deed” Rule to Rights of First
Refusal
In Klein v. McCullough, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the “stranger to the deed” rule did not apply to rights
of first refusal.92 Courts have described the “stranger to the deed” rule
as applied in West Virginia as meaning that “[a] reservation or an exception in favor of a stranger to a conveyance does not serve to recognize or confirm a right which does not exist in his favor when the conveyance which contains such reservation or exception is made.”93 The
court in Klein, however, indicated a possible inclination to abolish the
rule entirely.94
In 1995, Julia McCullough transferred to her son, Benjamin
McCullough, ownership of a parcel of land, including the oil and gas
rights that existed beneath the property.95 The deed included a “right
of first refusal” clause, requiring Benjamin McCullough to offer
Lanna Klein, his sister and a third party to the deed, the right of first
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 921.
Id. at 918–19.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 918.
Klein v. McCullough, 858 S.E.2d 909, 912 (W. Va. 2021).
Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 62 S.E.2d 337, 338 (W. Va. 1950).
Klein, 858 S.E.2d at 916.
Id.
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refusal to buy the property.96 Upon his death in 2010, Benjamin
McCullough’s wife, Darlene McCullough, inherited the entire estate,
including the subject parcel. Darlene McCullough subsequently sold
the property without regard to the right of first refusal clause.97 Lanna
Klein sued her sister-in-law, asking for the court to enforce the “right
of first refusal” clause.98
Darlene McCullough alleged that Lanna Klein was a “stranger”
to the deed and thus had no right of first refusal.99 The Circuit Court
of Tyler County accepted this argument, ruling in favor of Darlene
McCullough and rendering the right of first refusal in the deed “void,
inoperative,” and unenforceable.100
Lana Klein appealed the circuit court’s order to the Supreme
Court of Appeals, claiming that the circuit court was wrong in applying the “stranger to the deed” rule to a right of first refusal.101 She
argued that “a reservation or exception in a deed refers to an interest
that touches the land, while a right of first refusal exists separate from
the land and is simply a contractual right to receive an offer.”102 Thus,
she contended that the circuit court erred in applying the “stranger to
the deed” rule to rights of first refusal as the rule should apply only to
reservations and exceptions.103
The Court agreed with Lana Klein’s argument, stating that a right
of first refusal is indeed a contractual and preemptive right.104 Because
preemptive rights are different from reservations and exceptions, the
Court concluded that the “stranger to the deed” rule does not apply to
rights of first refusal.105 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.106
C. Validity of Tax Sale Following Duplicative Tax Assessment
In Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals ruled that a deed for property sold at a tax sale was
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 913.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 916.
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void where the property had been the subject of two tax assessments,
one of which had been paid as required.107
In 1906, Albert Schenk acquired a tract of farmland that was over
500 acres in size.108 In 1919, he executed an oil and gas lease for 202
acres underlying this tract.109 These real property interests passed from
Albert Schenk through successive generations, and at the time of the
litigation his great-great-grandsons, Frank and Brian Bonacci, owned
162.78 acres of the portion of the parcel subjected to the 1919 oil and
gas lease.110
In 1935, an assessor erroneously assessed based upon a severance
of a fractional mineral estate from the surface interest, resulting in two
assessments: one for the entire estate of more than 500 acres and another one for the oil and gas leasehold interests underlying the 202acre surface.111 The Bonacci’s predecessors paid the tax for the entire
estate but not for the duplicate assessment of the oil and gas leasehold
interest.112 Consequently, the assessor declared the taxes owed on the
oil and gas leasehold interests delinquent, and the oil and gas interests
were later sold in 1949 at a tax sale.113 These same oil and gas interests
also were sold at a tax sale in 1995, again based upon the nonpayment
of the duplicate assessment.114 Orville Young, LLC and Rolaco, LLC
(collectively referred to as “Orville Young”) claimed ownership of the
oil and gas rights based upon a purchase at the 1995 tax sale, and the
Bonaccis filed suit to quiet title of the oil and gas rights.115
The Circuit Court of Marshall County found the two assessments
to be “duplicative” because there had never been a severance of the
202-acre tract from the larger tract.116 Therefore, the circuit court ruled
that the 1949 tax sale was invalid and that the Bonaccis were the owner
of the oil and gas rights.117 Orville Young appealed the circuit court’s
ruling to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, arguing that
the tax sales were valid because the taxes had not been paid on the
separately assessed oil and gas interests.118
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

866 S.E.2d *91, *100–01 (W. Va. 2021).
Id. at *94–95.
Id. at *95.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *95–96.
Id. at *96.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *97.
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On November 18, 2021, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court’s decision that the tax deeds were
void.119 The Court first observed
when a single landowner owns both the surface and the subjacent mineral estate in a parcel of property and such mineral
estate has not been severed from the surface, the property
should be assessed as a single, whole unit and not as separate
assessments for the surface estate and the mineral estate.120
The court then cited precedent ruling that “[i]n case of two assessments of the same land, under the same claim of title, for any year, one
payment of taxes, under either assessment, is all the State can require.”121 The Court also interpreted West Virginia Code section 114-9 as meaning that one’s undivided interest in the surface and mineral
estate of a single property cannot be subject to more than one tax assessment.122 Since the Bonaccis or their predecessors had always paid
the tax on the entire estate in one full payment every year, the government was not entitled to receive any additional tax payments.123 Thus,
there had never been delinquency, and the Court found the tax sale
invalid.124
III. OHIO SUPREME COURT
A. Interpretation of Ohio Marketable Title Act
In Erickson v. Morrison, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that referencing a preexisting mineral interest in a recorded title transaction is
sufficient to preserve the interest under the Marketable Title Act even
if it does not state the record owner’s name.125
In 1926, James and Rose Logan conveyed the surface rights of
their property to Edward and Alta Riggs but retained the mineral rights
underlying the property.126 Thereafter, ownership of the surface rights
was conveyed several times throughout the years, each time with the

119. Id. at *101.
120. Id. at *98.
121. State v. Allen, 64 S.E. 140, 140 (W. Va. 1909).
122. Orville Young, 866 S.E.2d at 99.
123. Id. at 100–01.
124. Id. at 101.
125. Erickson v. Morrison, 176 N.E.3d 1 (Ohio 2021).
126. Id. at 2–3 (“Excepting and reserving therefrom all coal, gas, and oil with the
right of said first parties, their heirs and assigns, at any time to drill and operate for
oil and gas and to mine all coal.”).
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mention of the 1926 deed and mineral rights reservation language.127
The widower James Logan conveyed ownership of the mineral rights
to C.L. Ogle in 1941.128 In 2017, the heirs of Ogle filed a quiet title
action, seeking a court declaration that they have ownership of the
mineral rights to the land.129 The current surface right owners, Paul
and Vesta Morrison, asserted that the reservation of the mineral rights
“had been extinguished under Ohio’s Marketable Title Act or, alternatively, that the mineral rights were deemed abandoned under the
1989 version of R.C. 5301.56, Ohio’s Dormant Mineral Act.”130
The trial court sided with the Ogle heirs, but the Fifth District
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the
reservation of the mineral rights indeed was extinguished under
Ohio’s Marketable Title Act.131 The court of appeals noted that “the
Reservation does not state by whom the interest was originally reserved, nor to whom the interest was granted.”132 The Ogle heirs appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed to address the
issue of whether the Marketable Title Act requires “that a reservation
set forth the name of the person holding the interest in order to be specific and preserve the interest.”133
On appeal, the Ogle heirs argued that the reservation is not a “general reference” under R.C. 5301.49(A) because the owner of the reservation could be easily found after proceeding to a title search and,
for this reason, was not extinguished under Ohio’s Marketable Title
Act.134 To the contrary, the Morrisons argued that under the Marketable Title Act, “a title examiner needs to review only the language of
the root of title and the instruments recorded during the 40 years subsequent to the root of title to locate any specific references to an interest predating the root of title.”135 The Morrisons asserted that, in the
facts at hand, none of the recorded title transactions referred to the
owner of the mineral interests.136
On March 16, 2021, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals’ judgment.137 The Court reviewed existing precedent,
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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Blackstone v. Moore, in which it concluded that “a reference that includes the type of interest created and to whom the interest was
granted is sufficiently specific to preserve the interest in the record
title.”138 The Court clarified that Blackstone v. Moore did not require
that the title must identify the owner of the interest reservation and the
type of interest to prevent extinguishment under Ohio’s MarketableTitle Act.139 The Court added that “[n]othing in the plain language of
Ohio’s Marketable Title Act provides that a recital of a prior interest
is a general reference subject to being extinguished if it does not name
the interest’s owner.”140 Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that
referencing a preexisting mineral interest in a recorded title transaction
is sufficient to preserve the interest from extinguishment under the
Marketable Title Act even if it does not state the record owner’s
name.141 As such, the Ogle heirs were the owners of the mineral
rights.142
B. Applicable Standard to Review Utility Rate Increase for Pipeline
Extension Project
In Application of Suburban Natural Gas Co., the Ohio Supreme
Court rejected a utility rate increase sought by the company to reimburse it for costs incurred in a natural gas pipeline extension project.143
The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) granted the application of Suburban Natural Gas Company to charge higher rates to
its customers for public utility services after determining the usefulness of a 4.9-mile extension pipeline project.144 To determine the usefulness of the pipeline extension project, PUCO applied the “usedand-useful” test under R.C. 4909.15(A)(1).145 The Office of the Ohio
Consumers objected to PUCO’s higher utility rates, arguing that only
two miles of the extension project were deemed “used and useful” as
of the specified date of the determination of the project’s usefulness.146
On September 21, 2021, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed
PUCO’s order and remanded the matter for PUCO to properly apply
138. Blackstone v. Moore, 122 N.E.3d 132, 137 (Ohio 2018).
139. Erickson, 176 N.E.3d at 6.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 8.
142. See id.
143. In re Suburban Nat. Gas Co., No. 2020-0781, 2021 WL 4269964 at *1 (Ohio
Sept. 21, 2021).
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id.
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the use-and-useful standard.147 The Ohio Supreme Court held that
PUCO inappropriately applied the “prudent-investment” test, instead
of the “used-and-useful” test, by considering whether the investment
was prudent and improperly looked at the financial future of the project.148 According to the Court, the proper standard “measures usefulness as of the date certain, ‘not at some speculative unspecified point
in time.’”149
C. Approval of Certificate of Environmental Compatibility and
Public Need for Construction of Natural Gas Pipeline
In Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., the Ohio Supreme
Court allowed the construction and operation of Duke Energy’s Central Corridor Gas Pipeline Project to proceed.150
In November 2019, the Ohio Power Siting Board (“Board”)
granted a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need
to Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. for the construction and operation of the
Central Corridor Gas Pipeline.151 The cities of Reading and Blue Ash,
Neighbors Opposed to Pipeline Extension, LLC (“NOPE”), and the
village of Evendale appealed the Board’s approval order, alleging that
“the Board misapplied the statutory criteria governing certificate approval, decided the case on incomplete information, misweighed the
evidence, and limited their ability to meaningfully participate.”152
On September 22, 2021, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
Board’s certificate approval order.153 The Supreme Court found that
the Board appropriately interpreted R.C. 4906.10(A)(1), which requires it to identify the “need” for a major utility facility project and
not the “general public’s need” as argued by the plaintiffs.154 In addition, the Supreme Court noted that the Board adequately weighed the
evidence of need, due mainly to the necessity to upgrade aging pipeline infrastructure.155 The Court also observed that the Board properly
evaluated the project’s potential for environmental impacts under

147. Id. at *8.
148. Id. at *5–6.
149. Id. at *5.
150. In re Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., No. 2020-0511, 2021 WL 4301266, at *15
(Ohio Sept. 22, 2021).
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *1.
154. Id. at *15.
155. Id. at *5.
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R.C. 4906.10(A)(2).156 Finally, the Supreme Court contended that the
Board correctly determined that the project was safe.157

156. Id. at *7–8.
157. Id. at *8–9.

